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We carry out (formalize) the Karttunen-Stalnaker pragmatic account of presupposi-
tion projection within a state-of-the art version of dynamic epistemic logic. It turns
out that the basic projection facts can all be derived from a Gricean maxim ‘be infor-
mative’. This sheds light on a recent controversy on the appropriateness of dynamic
semantics as a tool for analysing presupposition.
1. Introduction
Pragmatic accounts of presupposition projection go back to Karttunen 1973; Kart-
tunen 1974 and Stalnaker 1972; Stalnaker 1974. These authors proposed an expla-
nation for the fact that the presupposition of a conjunction φ ∧ ψ consists of the
presupposition of φ conjoined with the implication assφ → presψ . When a speaker
utters this conjunction, she may take it for granted that the audience knows φ after
she has uttered this first conjunct. So even if φ is not presupposed initially, it will
be presupposed by the time she gets to assert ψ, for now the context has shifted to
encompass φ.
This idea has been worked out by various authors who have tried to make the idea
of shifting context precise, most notably Heim 1983, and presupposition projection
has been a major topic in dynamic semantics of natural language ever since, although
there have been dissenting voices, witness the attack in Schlenker 2007.
Recent advances in the logic of announcements and knowledge — the logic of
public announcements of Plaza 1989, the action style dynamics of Baltag et al. 1999,
and the axiomatisation of a very general logic of communication and change in van
Benthem et al. 2006 — make it possible to have another go at formalizing the in-
tuitions of Karttunen and Stalnaker. This task is taken up in this paper. Context is
represented (not as a set of propositions but) as a multimodal Kripke model, utter-
ances are (public) announcements, sequencing is uttering one announcement after
another, context shift is epistemic updating, common ground is common knowledge
between discourse partipants (or, more subtly, knowledge that the speaker believes
to have in common with the audience), and basic presuppositions are checks on com-
mon knowledge.
Indeed, it is obvious that the machinery is available for a sophisticated dynamic
epistemic account of presupposition, but as far as we know we are the first to actually
carry out such a task. We will show that the core of presupposition projection facts
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follows from the way in which announcements are composed in dynamic epistemic
logic.
2. The State of Knowledge of an Audience
The state of knowledge of an audience (or: set of agents I) is given by a multimodal
Kripke model M = (W,V,R) where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds,
V : P → P(W ) is a valuation that assigns to every basic proposition from a set
P the subset of all worlds where that proposition is true, and R is a function that
assigns to every agent I an epistemic indistinguishability relation∼i, wherew ∼i w′
indicates that agent i cannot see the difference between worlds w and w′.
Our language will have basic propositions from P , and boolean combinations
plus epistemic operations on these. We know from Baltag et al. 1999 that an ax-
iomatisation of public announcement logic in terms of reduction axioms is impos-
sible in the presence of common knowledge; the reason is that [!φ]Cψ (after public
announcement of φ it holds that ψ is common knowledge) cannot be expressed in
terms of common knowledge alone. In van Benthem et al. 2006 a reduction axiom
for retricted common knowledge is given, and it is also shown how public announce-
ments are reduced in the presence of composite epistemic operators, where the com-
position uses the regular operations. The appropriate logic for this is epistemic PDL,
which is what we will use in what follows. If p ranges over P and i over I , the
language of epistemic PDL with public announcements is given by:
φ ::= ⊤ | p | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ′ | [pi]φ | [!φ]φ′
pi ::= i |?φ | pi;pi′ | pi ∪ pi′ | pi∗
The interpretation of boolean formulas is as usual, that of [pi]φ is given by:
M, w |= [pi]φ iff for all v with (w, v) ∈ [[pi]]M : M, v |= φ,
where [[pi]]M is the interpretation of the epistemic construct pi. This is defined as in
PDL, with [[i]]M =∼i, [[?φ]]M = {(v, v) | v ∈ W and M, w |= φ}, [[pi;pi′]]M =
[[pi]]M ◦ [[pi′]]M (where ◦ is relational composition), [[pi ∪pi′]]M = [[pi]]M ∪ [[pi′]]M, and
[[pi∗]]M = ([[pi]]M)∗ (where ∗ is reflexive transitive closure).
What this says is that the basic epistemic operations i are interpreted by means
of∼i, and the composed ones by means of the regular operations on relations. Com-
mon knowledge is given by the reflexive transitive closure of the set of all individual
accessibilities lumped together: [(i∪ j∪· · · )∗]φ expresses that φ is common knowl-
edge, and (i ∪ j ∪ · · · )∗ is interpreted as the relation
(
⋃
i∈I
∼i)
∗.
The communicative effect of a public announcement φ is given by a restriction oper-
ation on epistemic models. If M = (W,V,R) then M | φ, the restriction of M with
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φ, is the epistemic model M′ = (W ′, V ′, R′) where W ′ = {v ∈ W | M, v |= φ},
V ′ is V restricted to W ′ (for each p ∈ P , V ′(p) = V (p) ∩W ′), and R′ is the result
of restricting each ∼i to W ′ ×W ′. Note that the restriction operation is a partial
function: if {v ∈ W | M, v |= φ} = ∅, then M | φ is undefined. The interpretation
of [!φ]ψ is given by:
M, w |= [!φ]ψ iff M, w |= φ implies M | φ,w |= ψ.
This logic has a sound and complete axiomatisation which consists of the axioms for
PDL (see Segerberg 1982), the axioms for individual S5 knowledge, and the rules
Modus Ponens, Necessitation for epistemic constructs pi, and Necessitation for pub-
lic announcements, plus a set of reduction axioms of the general form [!φ][pi]φ′ ↔
[pi′][!φ]φ′, where pi′ is the result of transforming pi with !φ. To give an example, if pi
is the epistemic construct (i ∪ j)∗ that expresses common knowledge between i and
j, then the reduction axiom for pi takes the following shape:
[!φ][(i ∪ j)∗]ψ ↔ [(?φ; i ∪ j)∗][!φ]ψ.
The transformed epistemic construct (?φ; (i ∪ j)∗ expresses so-called relativized
common knowledge. See van Benthem et al. 2006 for further details.
3. Making Announcements to an Audience
When a couple announces the birth of their child to the world (or, more likely, to
the readers of their evening paper) this is an assertion with an epistemic effect. It
creates common knowledge: the readers now know about the name, the gender, the
date, and the joy of the parents, and moreover, they know that other readers know all
this as well. Our basic communicative actions are public announcements to a given
audience.
Let’s investigate a special case of public announcement: announcements of the
form Cφ, where C is an abbreviation for the common knowledge operator.
First of all, notice that it does not matter if we restrict attention to point-generated
epistemic models, i.e., to models M = (W,V,R) with a distinguished worldw ∈W
(the actual world), and with the property that every v ∈W is reachable from w by a
sequence of accessibility steps. For pointed models (M, w) , we say that an update
with !φ aborts if M, w 6|= φ. We get the following:
Proposition 1 If M is generated from w, then for all announcements of the form
Cφ, either
M | Cφ = M
or the update operation with Cφ aborts in w.
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Proof: Assume M, w |= Cφ. Then φ is the case at every world that can be reached
through a sequence of accessibility steps. But then φ is the case everywhere in the
model, since M is generated from w. It follows that Cφ is also true everywhere,
and the restriction operation does not remove any worlds. If, on the other hand,
M, w 6|= Cφ, the update operation aborts. 2
To give an example of this, assume three atomic propositions m, a, u (m for
‘male’, a for ‘adult’ and u for ‘unmarried’), and consider the following Kripke
model.
m, a, u
m, a, u
m, a, u
m, a, u
i i
ii
i
i, j
The double circle in the picture indicates the actual world. Reflexive arrows are not
drawn; a connection between two worlds with label i means that i confuses these
worlds. What the model says is that m, a, u all hold in the actual world, but j does
not know about u, and i does not know about a and u. It is not difficult to see that in
the actual world (and in fact in all worlds)Cm holds, Ca does not hold, andCu does
not hold either. Here C is shorthand for [(i ∪ j)∗], the common knowledge operator
for i and j. Updating with !Cm (the announcement that m is common knowledge)
does not change the model. The updates with !Ca or !Cu, however, are undefined.
To handle lexical presuppositions in terms of public announcements, add the fol-
lowing shorthand to the logical language:
!(φ, φ′) abbreviates !(Cφ ∧ φ′).
Take the case of stating that someone is a bachelor, slightly simplified to fit our
propositional framework. This statement presupposes that m∧ a is common knowl-
edge, and asserts that u. The corresponding update bachelor equals !(m ∧ a, u), or
written out in full: !(C(m ∧ a) ∧ u). Updating the previous example model with
bachelor results in undefinedness, because, as we have seen, C(m ∧ a) does not
hold in the model. In the following example, where C(m ∧ a) holds in the initial
model, the update succeeds:
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m, a, u
m, a, u
i ⇒ bachelor ⇒ m, a, u
The basic presupposition projection facts now should fall out of our set-up, be-
cause the logic provides a natural interpretation for ‘being presuppositional update’,
namely: being a public announcement of the form !Cφ, and for ‘saying things in
order’, namely: making one public announcement after another.
Immediate from proposition 1 we get an illuminating fact about updates with
common knowledge:
Proposition 2 M, w |= [!Cφ]ψ iff M, w |= Cφ→ ψ.
Another thing we get from proposition 1 is that putting a presupposition before an
assertion has the same update effect as lumping them together:
Proposition 3 M, w |= [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)]ψ iff M, w |= [!Cφ][!φ′]ψ.
Proof: M, w |= [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)]ψ iff (proposition 1) M, w |= Cφ and (M, w |= φ′
implies M | φ′, w |= ψ) iff M, w |= Cφ and M, w |= [!φ′]ψ iff (proposition 1)
M, w |= [!Cφ][!φ′]ψ. 2
For the analysis of presupposition projection we need a slight generalization of
proposition 1:
Proposition 4 If M is generated from w, then for all announcements of the form
[!φ]Cψ, either
M | [!φ]Cψ = M
or the update operation with [!φ]Cψ aborts in w.
Proof: Assume M, w |= [!φ]Cψ. Then M, w |= φ implies M | φ,w |= Cψ.
Therefore, it holds for every v with M, v |= φ that M | φ, v |= ψ. It follows that
for all v with M, v |= φ we have M | φ, v |= Cψ. Therefore M, v |= [!φ]Cψ for
all v in the domain of M, and the restriction operation does not remove any worlds.
Alternatively, if M, w 6|= [!φ]Cψ, the update operation aborts. 2
The logic tells us that a formula of the form [!φ]Cψ reduces to a relativized com-
mon knowledge statement. We will abbreviate this as C(φ, ψ). Proposition 4 tells us
that updates with relativized common knowledge formulas express presuppositions.
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Next, the logic gives a precise meaning to updating with (φ, φ′) followed by
updating with (ψ, ψ′), namely:
[!(φ, φ′)][!(ψ, ψ′)]χ.
This abbreviates [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)][!(Cψ ∧ ψ′)]χ, or equivalently:
[!(Cφ ∧ φ′ ∧ [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)](Cψ ∧ ψ′))]χ.
which is in turn equivalent to:
[!(Cφ ∧ φ′ ∧ [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)]Cψ ∧ Cφ→ [φ′]ψ′)]χ.
The projected presupposition is Cφ ∧ [!(Cφ ∧ φ′)]Cψ and the projected assertion is
φ′ ∧ (Cφ→ [φ′]ψ′).
Take for example the statement without presupposition !m (the statement male)
followed by the statement bachelor):
[!m][!(C(m ∧ a) ∧ u)]χ
↔[!(m ∧ [!m](C(m ∧ a) ∧ u))]
↔[!(m ∧ [!m]Cm ∧ [!m]Ca ∧ [!m]u)]χ
↔[!(m ∧ [!m]Ca ∧ [!m]u)]χ
↔[!(m ∧ C(m, a) ∧m→ u)]χ
↔[!(C(m, a) ∧m ∧ u)]χ
So the presuppositional part of the combined statement is C(m, a) (common knowl-
edge of a relativized to m) and the assertional part is m ∧ u.
Negating a basic statement should produce an update that tests for the same pre-
supposition but that negates the assertion, in other words, so the negation of (φ, φ′)
is (φ,¬φ′). This generalizes to complex statements by means of the above separa-
tion of the presuppositional and assertional parts. For instance, implication between
statementsA andB whereA is of the form !(Cφ∧φ′) andB of the form !(Cψ∧ψ′)
reduces to negating the sequence consisting of !(Cφ ∧ φ′) !(Cψ ∧ ¬ψ′), which we
know already how to do. This analysis allows us to compute the projection facts for
such cases.
4. Presuppositions and Informativeness
Suppose we are in a context where the presupposition p is common knowledge. Then
updating with statement !(Cp ∧ q) has the same effect as updating with !q. If on
the other hand, p is true in the actual world but not yet common knowledge, then
updating with !(Cp ∧ q) will lead to an inconsistent state, but updating with !p fol-
lowed by an update with !(Cp ∧ q) will not. If M, w |= p and M, w 6|= Cp then
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M, w |= [!Cp∧q]⊥ and M, w |= ¬[!p][!(Cp∧q)]⊥. In other words, the logic allows
the use of !p followed by !(Cp ∧ q) in cases where p is compatible with the context
model but not yet common knowledge, but in such cases the use of just !(Cp ∧ q)
is ruled out. Accommodation of the presupposition would consist of replacement of
!(Cp∧q) by [!p][!(Cp∧q)]; as a matter of fact the update sequence [!p][!(Cp∧q)] and
the single update !(p ∧ q) are equivalent. The logic allows the use of !(Cp ∧ q) and
of !p followed by !(Cp∧ q) in contexts where p is common knowledge. By invoking
the Gricean maxim ‘be informative’ one can explain why !p followed by !(Cp ∧ q)
is not appropriate in such contexts.
5. Conclusion and Further Work
We hope we have convinced the reader that the program of giving a formal pragmatic
account of presuppositions can be carried out in the framework of multimodal epis-
temic logic with relativized common knowledge and public announcement updates.
In order to forge from this a working tool for computational linguists, by extending
the language to include quantifiers and a dynamic treatment of anaphoric linking,
further work is needed.
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